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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Culley appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his
guilty plea to second degree murder. Culley contends the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and in imposing
sentence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Culley on three charges: (1) first degree murder for his
involvement in the murder of his aunt, Elizabeth Baune, which murder occurred
during the course of a "robbery and/or burglary"; (2) grand theft; and (3) burglary.
(R., pp.27-28, 95-96.)

Elizabeth died from multiple stab wounds to her chest and

head; she was "stabbed a total of 29 times," including four stab wounds that
penetrated her skull and two that "went all the way through her skull." (PSI, p.7.)
Elizabeth was left with an eight inch knife "lodged in her head." (PSI, p.7.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Culley pied guilty to second degree murder
and the state dismissed the remaining charges and agreed not to file charges on
"some burglaries and thefts" that Culley disclosed to law enforcement.

(R., pp.102-

103; 10/9/2013 Tr., pp.1-15) There was no agreement limiting the state's sentencing
recommendation.

(10/9/2013 Tr., p.2, Ls.19-21.) As part of the plea agreement,

Culley waived his rights to "file a motion to reduce or amend [his] sentence pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rules, Rule 35," and "to file a motion to withdraw [his] plea once a
plea has been entered." (Plea Agreement, p.4 (exhibit to PSI), attached hereto as
Appendix A.)
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to sentencing, Culley

withdraw his guilty plea.

asserted his "guilty plea was not made knowingly and
"the medication he was on at the time of the guilty plea and leading up to the guilty
plea," and that he "was threatened by other inmates that he would suffer physical
harm if he did not accept a plea deal."

(R, pp.118-120.)

The court held an

evidentiary hearing on Culley's motion after which it entered a written order denying
Culley's request to withdraw his guilty plea.

(R, pp.127-128 (court minutes of

hearing), 130-141 (memorandum decision denying motion, attached hereto as
Appendix B).)
Following a lengthy sentencing hearing, the court imposed a unified life
sentence with 45 years fixed. (R, pp.145-150 (court minutes), 154-155 Uudgment).)
Culley filed a timely notice of appeal. (R, pp.161-163.)
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ISSUES
states

issues on appeal as:

1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Culley's motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified
sentence of life, with 45 years fixed, following Mr. Culley's plea of
guilty to second degree murder?

(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Should
erred in denying his
right to withdraw his
failed to establish an
his guilty plea?

this Court decline to consider his claim that the district court
motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Culley waived his
plea as part of his plea agreement? Alternatively, has Culley
abuse of discretion in the denial of his motion for withdrawal of

2.
Has Culley failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a unified life sentence with 45 years fixed for the brutal murder of Elizabeth
Baune?
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ARGUMENT

L
This Court Should Decline To Consider Culley's Claim That The District Court
Abused Its Discretion By Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea Because
Culley Waived His Right To File Such A Motion As Part Of His Plea Agreement;
Alternatively, Culley Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion
A.

Introduction
Culley argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-12.) This Court should
decline to consider Culley's argument because, by the terms of his plea agreement,
Culley waived his right to file such a motion. Alternatively, Culley has failed to show
the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion. Application of the law
to the record and the facts found by the district court supports the district court's
determination that Culley failed to show he was entitled to withdraw his plea.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A plea agreement is contractual in nature, must be measured by contract law

standards, and as a question of law, this Court exercises free review."

State v.

Cope, 142 Idaho 492,495,129 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006) (citing Dunlap v. State, 141
Idaho 50, 63, 106 P.3d 376, 389 (2004)).

Waiver of a right as part of a plea

agreement is reviewed using the same analysis employed "in determining the
validity of any guilty plea." State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720
(1994). The waiver is enforceable if the record shows it was voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently made.

Cope, 142 Idaho at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245; Murphy, 125

Idaho at 456, 872 P.2d at 719.

4

"Appellate review

the

of a motion

withdraw a plea is limited to

whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330,
334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings
if they are supported by substantial competent evidence.

State v. Holland, 135

Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 869 P.2d 571
(Ct. App. 1994).

C.

Culley Knowingly And Voluntarily Waived His Right To File A Motion To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea
Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are generally reviewed using

contract law standards. State v. Taylor, 157 Idaho 369, _ , 336 P.3d 302, 305 (Ct.
App. 2014) (citations omitted). "As with other types of contracts, the interpretation of
unambiguous terms and the legal effect of the plea agreement are questions of law
to be decided by the court."

& (citing

State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410-411, 64

P.3d 335, 336-337 (Ct. App. 2003)).
Pursuant to the plain language of his plea agreement, Culley waived, without
any express or implied limitation, his "right to withdraw [his] plea once a plea has
been entered."

(Appendix A, p.4.)

Culley entered his guilty plea on October 9,

2013. (See generally Tr., pp.1-15.) More than four months later, on February 28,
2014, Culley moved to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.118-120.) Culley's motion
was precluded by his plea agreement, and the district court should have declined to
consider it.
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appeal, Culley does
generally Appellant's Brief, pp.5-1

the validity of his waiver.
Instead, he dismisses

effect

(See
waiver

because "the district court decided the motion on the merits." (Appellant's Brief, p.2
n.1.) That "the district court decided the motion on the merits" does not, however,
preclude this Court from affirming the district court's decision on the basis of waiver.
See, ~ ' State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 346, 256 P.3d 750, 754 (2011)
("Although the district court held that Kirsch had actual authority to consent to the
home search, we decline to address this issue and affirm on the alternative grounds
that the warrant was justified by apparent authority.").
Because Culley waived his right to request withdrawal of his guilty plea, and
because he does not challenge the validity of that waiver on appeal, this Court
should affirm based on Culley's waiver.

D.

Even If This Court Reviews The District Court's Decision Denying Culley's
Motion To Withdraw His Plea, Despite Culley's Waiver Of The Right To File
Such A Motion, Culley Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its
Discretion
Even if this Court considers the merits of Culley's claim that the district court

abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Culley has
failed to show the district court abused its discretion.

Culley claims otherwise,

arguing "his long-term drug abuse, and the drugs he was on at the time of his plea,
limited his memory of the offense," but he has since "remember[ed]" he is not guilty.
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Culley also contends his plea was involuntary because, he
claims, "he was threatened with bodily harm if he did not plead guilty." (Appellant's
Brief, p.5.)
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A

a

plea is governed

(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the
defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.
Although a district court's discretion should be "liberally exercised" when
ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made prior to the pronouncement of
sentence, withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right. State v. Hanslovan,
147 Idaho 530, 535, 211 P.3d 775, 780 (Ct. App. 2008). Rather, "the defendant has
the burden of showing a 'just reason' exists to withdraw the plea." Hanslovan, 147
Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780 (citations omitted).

Where, as in this case, the

defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing but after he has
"learned of the content of the PSI or has received other information about the
probable sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the
defendant's apparent motive." State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222, 177 P.3d 966,
969 (2008) (citing State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App.
2004)). Failure to present and support a just or plausible reason, even absent
prejudice to the prosecution, will weigh against granting withdrawal.
Idaho at 647, 84 P.3d at 583.

Mayer, 139

"[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the

defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for
the trial court to decide." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782 (citations
omitted).
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'The first step

a motion to withdraw a

plea is to determine

the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made."

Hanslovan,

147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959,
801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). This step involves a three-part inquiry: (1)
whether Culley understood the nature of the charges and whether he was coerced;
(2) whether Culley "knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to
confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself," and (3) whether
Culley understood the consequences of his guilty plea.

State v. Anderson, 156

Idaho 230, 234, 322 P.3d 312, 316 (Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted). "On appeal,
Idaho law requires that voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must be
reasonably inferred from the record as a whole."

Js;L A review of Culley's plea

colloquy and the record support the district court's finding that Culley's guilty plea
was constitutionally valid.
The written plea agreement, which Culley signed, states that Culley was
charged with first degree murder, grand theft, and burglary, but he would plead guilty
to an amended charge of second degree murder and the state would dismiss the
grand theft and burglary charges.

(Appendix A, p.3.) At the guilty plea hearing,

Culley acknowledged he signed the written plea agreement, and when asked if he
understood what was going to happen, Culley responded:

"I'm pleading guilty to

second degree murder." 1 (10/9/2013 Tr., p.3, Ls.7-11.) The court advised Culley of

The court also indicated it reviewed Culley's Guilty Plea Advisory Form and Culley
agreed that he "went through" that form with his attorney. (10/9/2013 Tr., p.4, Ls.1114.) Although the written plea agreement is included in the record as an attachment
to the PSI, it appears the Guilty Plea Advisory Form is not part of the record on
appeal. Grant v. State, 156 Idaho 598, 605 n.5, 329 P.3d 380, 387 n.5 (Ct. App.
1
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the maximum penalties for second degree murder, and reiterated that, under the
terms of the plea agreement, the state was not limited in its sentencing
recommendation; Culley indicated he understood. (10/9/2013 Tr., p.4, L.24 - p.6,
L.2; see Appendix A, p.3.) Culley also said he understood that, regardless of any
recommendations, the court could "impose the maximum penalty." (10/9/2013 Tr.,
p.6, Ls.3-10.)
Culley also acknowledged the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. The
written plea agreement states that Culley's attorney explained his constitutional
rights and that, if Culley pied not guilty, he would be entitled to a "speedy and public
jury trial by an impartial jury" where the state would have the burden of proving his
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and at which he would have the right to remain
silent, to confront the witnesses against him, and to compulsory process to obtain
witnesses and evidence in his defense. (Appendix A, p.2.) The Guilty Plea Advisory
Form that Culley initialed and reviewed with his attorney also listed the rights he was
waiving by pleading guilty, including the rights to a jury trial, to present a defense,
andtoconfronthisaccusers. (10/9/2013Tr., p.4, Ls.11-23, p.6, L.11-p.7, L.11.)
With respect to coercion, the written plea agreement Culley signed includes
the following representation:

"My decision to plead guilty is made freely and

voluntarily. I have not been induced to plead guilty by any force, coercion, pressure,
or fear."

(Appendix A, p.2 1[ 6.)

The written agreement and the colloquy also

addressed whether Culley was under the influence of any substance. Specifically, in

2014) ("missing portions of the record must be presumed to support the action of the
trial court").
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agreement, signed by
the

represented that he was "not under

any substance, such as a narcotic or alcohol, that would affect [his]

ability to understand the nature and consequences of [his] action in entering a guilty
plea." (Appendix A, p.4 ,-i 13.) Then, during the colloquy, the following exchange
occurred:
THE COURT: Okaf Well, now, Mr. Culley, do you -- it
indicates on this document[ ] that you suffer from a bipolar disorder,
ADHD, and you're taking some medication for those conditions. Is that
true?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do those disorders prevent you from thinking
clearly today or understanding the proceedings?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Do you think you can understand what's going
on just fine?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And the medication you're taking does that affect
your ability to think or reason or understand what's going on today?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: So as you sit here today you feel clearheaded
and have the ability to go forward voluntarily?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
(10/9/2013 Tr., p.8, L.10- p.9, L.4.)
The district court found Culley's response to its questions "were clear,
coherent, and deliberate." (R., p.135 (Appendix 8).) In addition, as noted by the

2

Presumably the district court is referring to the Guilty Plea Advisory Form, which,
as noted, is not included in the record on appeal.
10

district court, Culley underwent a psychological evaluation and the evaluator
determined Culley understood the charges against him and the consequences of his
guilty plea. (R, p.137 (Appendix 8).)
Culley's representations on the signed written plea agreement and the Guilty
Plea Advisory Form, and his statements during his plea colloquy demonstrate his
guilty plea was constitutionally valid. The district court correctly concluded as much.
(R., p.138 (Appendix B) ("Based on the evidence from the record of the defendant's
entry of plea and the psychological evaluations conducted by Dr. Ward, this Court
finds that the defendant's entry of plea complied with Idaho Criminal Rule 11.").)
Culley has failed to demonstrate this conclusion is erroneous.
"If the plea is constitutionally valid, the court must then determine whether
there are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the plea." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho
at 536, 211 P.3d at 781 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d
1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)).

In his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Culley

asserted "the medication he was on at the time of the guilty plea and leading up to
the guilty plea prevented him from making an intelligent and knowledgeable
decision" and "threats from other inmates resulted in [him] entering a plea of guilty
that was coerced and not voluntary." (R., pp.119-120.)

In support of his motion,

Culley submitted two affidavits. (Augmentation.) In his first affidavit, Culley averred:
During the change of plea, this Honorable Court asked me if
anyone had made any threats to me that would cause me to plead
guilty and I responded, no.
In truth other inmates threatened me, that I could suffer physical
harm while in jail or prison and I would suffer physical harm if I testified
against the codefendant and did not take a plea deal.
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Later, while handcuffed within the Payette jail
being
escorted by a Payette Deputy, an inmate struck me causing a
laceration
face
breaking
glasses.
On my current medication I am thinking more clear and I believe
that there are facts that would cause a jury to find me not guilty of the
offense charged.
(Affidavit of Michael Culley in Support of Motion to Withdraw, filed February 28, 2014
(augmentation).)
In his second affidavit, Culley identified John Riggs as the person who
allegedly told him "to plead guilty and not testify against the codefendant or else
[Culley] would suffer physical harm." (Second Affidavit of Michael Culley in Support
of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, p.1, filed March 13, 2014 (augmentation).)

In

addition, Culley stated he still believed Riggs' "threats to be credible," but claimed he
"no longer [felt] compelled to plead guilty." (Id., p.1.) Culley also alleged that since
he pied guilty his medications were changed and he now "remember[s] more facts of
the case that [he] believe[s] will show [he is] not guilty of the crimes charged." (Id.,
p.2.)
As Culley acknowledged in his first affidavit, his claim of coercion is
contradicted by the representations he made when he pied guilty.

Further, the

factual basis of his coercion claim was controverted by the state at the hearing on
Culley's motion.

Clarence Costner, the jail commander for the Payette County

Sherriff's Office, testified that the jail maintains records of incidences between
inmates.

(3/13/2014 Tr., p.21, L.2 - p.22, L.1.)

Commander Costner reviewed

Culley's records, which reflected two incidents involving Culley - one between
Culley and his roommate, Tyler Naughton, and one between Culley and an "inmate
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named

Palomares,

breaking Culley's

ended
3/2014

Palomares
L.5

1.)

The incident between Culley and Naughton occurred sometime before August 2013,
and the incident involving Palmoares was August 22, 2013. (3/13/2014 Tr., p.24, L.8
- p.25, L.2.) There was no record of any other fights involving Culley, including no
record of an altercation between Culley and Riggs.

(3/13/2014 Tr., p.27, L.23 -

p.28, L.9; see p.30, Ls.7-13.) Moreover, there was no evidence that the altercations
in which Culley was involved were in any way related to the murder charge pending
against him. (3/13/2014 Tr., p.35, L.10 - p.36, L.7, p.39, L.18 - p.40, L.5.) On this
point, the district court specifically found the evidence did not "support a finding that
the reported incidents were related to this particular case." (R., p.140 (Appendix B).)
The district court also noted the following testimony from Commander
Costner:
Payette County Jail Commander, Clarence Costner, testified
that he had received no information that the defendant and Riggs had
ever gotten into an argument or had an altercation. He stated that
Riggs and the codefendant, Hernandez, were housed together for a
short time, but according to Costner, Riggs left the Payette County Jail
and went to prison in April 2013. This was five months prior to Culley's
guilty plea. It is hard to believe that any threat made by Riggs over five
months earlier continued to haunt the defendant. Furthermore, codefendant Hernandez had changed his plea to guilty in August, 2013,
approximately six weeks prior to Culley's plea of guilty. So at the time
of the guilty plea, there was never a necessity to testify against codefendant Hernandez.
(R., p.140 (Appendix B).)
Based on the evidence presented, the district court found Culley's guilty plea
was not coerced by "threats of physical harm."

(R. p.140 (Appendix B).)

This

conclusion is supported by the record and Culley offers no valid basis for rejecting
13

district
Culley asserts

conclusion.

(See generally Appellant's Brief, pp

"despite the actual physical attack [by Palomares],

Instead,
district

court found there was 'no evidence in the record to indicate that the defendant was
coerced into pleading guilty by threats of physical harm."' (Appellant's Brief, p.9.)
This assertion does not establish clear error in the district court's finding because
there was, in fact, no evidence that the altercation with Palomares was related to the
pending murder charge, nor did Culley present any evidence of specific threats. The
only evidence was to the contrary. Culley's claim of error fails.
In support of the second reason Culley offered in support of his motion, Culley
presented the testimony of Dr. Clay Ward.

(3/13/2014 Tr., pp.4-20.)

Dr. Ward

testified that he visited with Culley "within the past week" to "evaluat[e] for any
changes in his mental state and his memory of events, his clinical presentation."
(3/13/2014 Tr., p.5, Ls.15-22.) Dr. Clay previously met with Culley on December 31,
2013, and January 18, 2014. (3/13/2014 Tr., p.5, L.23- p.6, L.1.) Dr. Ward testified
that when he met with Culley in December and January, Culley was "cooperative"
with "some delay in his processing speed" and "some gaps in his memory," but "his
thinking was logical and coherent." (3/13/2014 Tr., p.11, Ls.8-13.) However, when
Dr. Ward met with Culley in the "past week," Culley's "speech was more pressured"
and "more rapid," his "thought processes were somewhat more loose ... in the
sense ... there was some illogical portions" and Culley was "at times ... almost
delusional" and had "magical sort of thinking." (3/13/2014 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-23.) Dr.
Ward also described Culley as "more animated" and "thinking more quickly."
(3/13/2014 Tr., p.11, Ls.23-24.) Comparing Culley's most recent behavior with what
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observed in January, Dr. Vvard
was positive but the illogical

quickness of what
it or the almost delusional

was
it," was

"definitely" "negative." (3/13/2014 Tr., p.11, L.25 - p.12, L.6.) Dr. Ward also noted
that Culley "was able to provide a lot more details" and his "memory component was
improved." (3/13/2014 Tr., p.12, Ls.7-10.)
Following cross-examination, the district court asked Dr. Ward if he reviewed
the records or was aware of the medications Culley was taking on or about October
9, 2013, which was the date Culley pied guilty. (3/13/2014 Tr., p.19, Ls.15-17.) Dr.
Ward responded, "No, I'm not." (3/13/2014 Tr., p.19, L.18.)
The district court discussed Culley's "change in medication" argument and
stated that it could not "conclude that [Culley's] mental condition has improved. To
the contrary, his mental condition apparently is less coherent today than when Dr.
Ward evaluated him on December 31, 2013 and January 18, 2014."

(R., p.141

(Appendix B).) The district court further found that the evidence "does not support a
conclusion that the medication [Culley] was taking on October 9, 2013 had any effect
on his ability to enter a knowing, intelligent and voluntary entry of plea." (R., p.141
(Appendix B).)
On appeal, Culley claims the district court's "finding ignores a critical
consideration; even if [his] thinking was not as coherent, Dr. Ward said at two points
that [his] memory was actually better." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) As evidence of his
improved memory, Culley relies on Exhibit 1, which the state presented at the
hearing on Culley's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (3/13/2014 Tr., p.63, L.15 p.65, L.6.) Exhibit 1 is a letter Culley wrote to his grandfather, which is dated March

15

5, 2014.

(Exhibit 1, p.1; see 3/13/2014 Tr., p.63, Ls.22-24.) According to Culley,

Exhibit 1 "makes it clear that [he] was remembering more detail that may have led
an acquittal for murder."

(Appellant's Brief, p.11.)

to

Although neither of Culley's

affidavits identify the new details demonstrating his innocence that Culley
supposedly remembered, it appears from the testimony presented at the hearing on
his motion that the new details involved him having a hammer that he was
supposedly going to throw at Hernandez, but Hernandez threatened him with a gun
before saying, "You are either with me or your [sic] not."

(Exhibit 1, pp.2-3;

3/13/2014 Tr., p.65, L.11 - p.67, L.B.) Culley's new memory about a hammer and a
gun do not constitute a just reason to withdraw his plea.
As noted in the district court's order, Culley has always claimed that
Hernandez made the "you are with me or you're not" statement.
(Appendix B).)

(R., pp.136-138

And, Dr. Ward testified that Culley has "always admitted that he

stabbed [Elizabeth]." (3/13/2014 Tr., p.68, Ls.22-23.) Even in his letter, he writes
(verbatim), in relevant part:

I nelt over my aunt she was barely breathing I felt a jab from the curtain
rods Johnny had picked up my glasses flew off I stabbed my aunt
multiple times till she stoped gurgaling Johnny punched me and told
me to stop crying I found my glasses and then thought about my aunt
suffering till my mom got home I stabed her in the head and drove the
knife into her brain so she would not suffer I then picked up myself we
found the keys and I yelled my mom will be here any second
(Exhibit 1, p.3.)
While Culley claims he remembered details that show his innocence, he
presented no evidence of such. Even if Culley believes he has some unarticulated
reasons for proclaiming his innocence, despite the evidence to the contrary, "[a]
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mere assertion of innocence,

itself, is not grounds to withdraw a guilty plea."

Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at

(citations

. "[S]o long as a

factual basis for the plea exists, the court may accept a tactical guilty plea even from
a defendant who continues to assert his innocence."

kt

Culley provided a factual

basis for his guilty plea, his attorney agreed a factual basis exists, and the district
court correctly rejected Culley's claim that he should be entitled to withdraw that plea
based on his change of medication and new memories. (10/9/2013 Tr., p.13, L.16p.15, L.24; R., pp.140-141 (Appendix B).)
Culley has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea given that the plea was constitutionally valid and
Culley offered no just reason to withdraw it.

11.
Culley Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Culley contends the district court abused

sentencing.

its discretion in imposing

More specifically, Culley argues his sentence "is not necessary to

achieve the goals of sentencing." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Culley is incorrect. The
district court acted well within its discretion and consistent with the objectives of
sentencing in imposing a unified life sentence with 45 years fixed for Culley's
involvement in the brutal murder of his aunt, Elizabeth Baune.

B.

Standard Of Review
A district court's sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009).
17

State v.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
In order

demonstrate an abuse

the

court's

Culley must "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence
was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover,
140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: "(1) protection
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). Culley cannot meet his burden in this
case.
In imposing sentence, the district court recited the objectives of sentencing
and indicated it "looked at each one of these factors." (Sent. Tr., p.193, Ls.18-23.)
The court then outlined its sentencing rationale in detail, addressing each objective.
(Sent. Tr., p.193, L.23-p.199, L.12.)
On appeal, Culley claims "[t]here are several mitigating factors that illustrate
why [his] sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts."
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Culley identifies those factors as his "severe mental health
issues as a result of his abusive childhood," his long history of drug abuse, his
history of sexual abuse, and his young age when he murdered is aunt. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.12-17.) All of this information was, however, before the district court and
considered by the court in imposing sentence, and none of the information compels
a lower sentence. That Culley disagrees with how the district court weighed the
evidence and balanced the objectives of sentencing does not show an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011) ("In
18

case, Windom essentially asks this
district

to re-weigh the evidence presented to

and reach a different conclusion ...

our

is

reweigh the evidence considered by the district court; our role is to determine
whether reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as did the district
court.").
Based on the nature of the offense, Culley's character, and the objectives of
sentencing, a unified life sentence with 45 years fixed is not excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Culley's judgment of
conviction for second degree murder.
DATED this 2?1h day of February, 2015.

J · SSICA M. LORELLO
Jeputy Attorney General
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OCT O9 2013

Prosecuting Attorney
1115 1st Avenue North
Payette, ID 83661
(208) 642-6096
(208) 642-6099

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
MICHAEL JOSEPH CULLEY,
Defendant.

)
) CASENO.: CR-2012-2423
)
) PLEA AGREEMENT
)
)
)
)
)

1. I, MICHAEL JOSEPH CULLEY, the Defendant in the above referenced matter, have
been informed by my attorney and in open couit on this date of my constitutional rights in
the above entitled case, and I have read and fully understand the following:
2. I understand that this plea agreement reflects the entire agreement reached by the parties

. and stipulate to it being made a part of the record in this matter. I FURTIIER
UNDERSTAND THAT THE JUDGE IS NOT BOUND BY THE SENTENCING
RECOMMENDATION.
3. I have received and read a copy of all paits of the Information or Indictment in this matter
and I understand the nature of the charges that have been made against me. I have
discussed the same with my attorney and 1 have told my attorney all I lmow about the
matters referred to in it.

Plea Agreement 1

has explained"my' constitutional figlits,"·and 'the pur1ishme11t

imposed by the court upon my plea of guilty,
5. I understand that ifI plead not guilty to any count or counts in the Information or

Indictment, the following will occur:
a.

I would be presumed im1ocent of the charges against me in such count or
counts;

b.

I would be entitled to a speedy and public jury trial by an impartial jury in

which the burden would be upon the State to establish my guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of all twelve (12) jurors; and
c.

Upon such trial 1) I would be entitled to remain silent and no inference could
be drawn against me because of my silence; 2) I could, if I wished, testify on
my own behalf; 3) I would be entitled to confront and cross~examine all
witnesses against me; 4) I would be entitled to compulsory process of the
court to obtain witnesses and evidence to be offered in my defense.

6. My decision to plead guilty is made freely and voluntarily. I have not been induced to
plead guilty by any force, coercion, pressure, or fear.
7. If I am not a naturalized citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or making of
factual admissions could have consequences of depo1tation, exclusion of admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization.

8. I understand the following conditions apply to this plea agreement:
a. At sentencing, the State is free to discuss the contents of the pre sentence
investigation and to facilitate victim impact statements.
Plea Agreement 2

I

'l
scheduled and upon appearing at sentencing as scheduled by the court. If I fail to
appear at any scheduled hearing, the sentencing and/or plea agreement may be
withdrawn by the State.
c. Titls offer is contingent upon my having only the prior cdminal history reflected
in the State's Response for Discovery. IfI fail to disclose criminal history not
reflected in the State's response or if prior criminal convictions are later
discovered, the sentencing and/or plea agreement may be withdrawn by the State.
9. I am currently charged with Count I - MURDER IN TH:ii: Fill.ST DEGREE ( Felony),

Count II - GRAND THEFT BY RECEMNG/POSSESSING STOLEN PROPERTY
( Felony) and Count ID - BURGLARY ( Felony). I understand that, upon pleading

guilty to the amended charge - Count I of Murder in the 2 nd Degree (Felony) in Case
No. CR-2012-2423, the following will occur:

a. At sentencing, the Prosecuting Attorney will dismiss Counts II and III

of the Amended Indictment,
b. At sentencing, the State will recommend penalties as follows:
sentencing will be open ended,
c. I understand I will be required to pay restitution on all charges
herein, in the amount of $2000 to ISP Forensics. $5781.44 to the

Crime Victims Compensation Program. $19,729 to Oregon Mutual
Insurance Company, $1028 to Nicholas, Michael and Christopher

Plea Agreement 3

I'

Baune: $374.82' to Wayne Buxton~- TBD

cleaning

Passport and Cricut Die-Cut which may be in the Honda Passport.
d. Restitution will be joint and several with Jonathon Hernandez, CoDefendaut herein.
oz.u.,...~1:1,,,.,.,.J ~l'\~v..:,,. ~f~res.{11--vd--r~ ti,.___ (>fo ot..t:11_> 1>'l-l::,B'1( 1°-n-!>'b~I
e. If the public defender was appointed to represent me, the State will 1·1- 1oSS'8
Ct/kl f-3. ~ /¥2.1$
request reimbursement to the County in an amount consistent with f:h tl. r-r~s wi/l

!

/1DJ... ~

f?Q.J. '
'((\ v

Administrative Ordel' 2000-1.

"/Vt-}rlI am not bound by this sentencing l'ecommendation and may argue for a lesser sentence.
I am bound by the above restitution amount and may not object and/or appeal said

restitution amount.

I0.

In exchange for the above terms, I agree as follows:

a.

To waive my right to file a motion to reduce or amend my sentence pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rules, Rule 35; and

b.

To waive my right to file a motion to withdraw my plea once a plea has been
entered.

11. I have discussed all the elements of this plea agreement ,v:itb my lawyer and he or she has
explained every detail of the plea agreement to me to my satisfaction. ·
12. I am satisfied with my lawyers representation of me in this matter and do not believe he
or she is incompetent or apathetic to the outcome of my case.
13. I am not under the influence of any substance, such as a narcotic 01· alcohol, that would

affect my ability to understand the nature and consequences ofmy action in entering a
guilty plea.

Plea Agreement 4

I

14. I understand that plea negotiatforis recognize the economic considerations of limited
prosecutorial resources. I understand that the State does not punish a citizen for
asserting the right to a jury trial, but the State makes concessions as to charging and/or
sentencing recommendations in exchange for a swift and certain resolution of a case.
15. Finally, I understand that the Judge is not bound or obligated to follow the sentencing
recommendations of the prosecutor when detennining what sentence he or she will
impose and is free to impose whatever sentence he or she deems just and fit.
Dated this .!I__ day of October, 2013.

~-~

MICffAli' JOSEPH CULLEY
Defendant

I, Matthew J. Roker, the attorney for the above named defendant, have reviewed the
foregoing with and have explained to Michael Joseph Culley the nature of the charges against him,
his constitutional rights and the punishment that could be imposed upon his guilty plea.

n~LR£Matthew J. Rokep'

Attorney for Defendant

Plea Agreett1ent 5

1

Offered this ·sth

offer is open only

on

the day of the Status Conference. Acceptance of this offer must be in VrTiting prior to the above
deadline.

ANNE-MARIE KELSO

l'AYE~INGATTORNEY
By:

.....,,...,~C-r----"--------

/ Barbara J. Richart
Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attomey

Plea Agreement 6

APPENDIXB
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PAYETTE COUNTY, IOAl-10

MAR 17 2014
DRESSEN.CLERK
-eo,Ji'-'----..uEPUTY

IN Tiffi DISTRICT COURT OF Tiffi TIIlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
STAIB OF IDAHO,

)
)

)
)

Plaintiff,

VS.

MICHAEL CULLEY,
Defendant

CASE NO. CR 2012-2423

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
UPON MOTION TO WITIIDRAW
GUILTY PLEA PURSUANT TO
IDAHO CRIMINAL RULE 33(c)

)

The above-captioned case came on for hearing on March 13, 2014 upon Defendant's

Motion to Withdraw Gtilty Plea. The State was represented by Anne-Marie Kelso and Barbara
Richart, Payette County Prosecuting Attorneys. The defendant was represented by bis attorney,
Matthew J. Roker. The Court has considered the briefing, the testimony and exhibits admitted at the
hearing, and oral arguments presented by counsel, and hereby finds as follows.

PROCEDURAL IDSTORY
On November 19, 2012, the Grand Jury of Payette County returned an Indictment against
the defendant charging him with Murder in the First Degree, Gmnd Theft by Possession of Stolen

Property, and Burglary.
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON MOTION TO
WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY PURSUANT TO ICR 33(C)
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On October 9, 2013, a change of plea hearing was held. The State filed an Amended

Indictment charging :Michael Culley with the felony offense of Murder in the Second Degree in
Count I, and the felony offense of Grant Theft by Receiving Stolen Property in Count II, and the
felony offense of Burglary in Count III. At that time, a written agreement pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 11 was also filed with the Court that set forth an agreement that the State would
dismiss Counts II and m of the Amended Indictment in exchange for a plea of guilty to Count I,
Murder in the Second Degree. Mr. Roker verbally delineated the Rule 11 agreement for the record.
The defendant was swam in by the clerk and questioned by the Court regarding his understanding

of the plea agreement In addition, the Court reviewed with the defendant the guilty plea advisory
form, Appendix A to the Idaho Criminal Rules.

The defendant mtered a plea of guilty to the felony offense of Murder in the Second Degree.
The Court concluded from interviewing the defendant that there was a factual basis for his plea.
The Court ordered a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI) and appointed a psychologist to report

upon the defendant's mental condition pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. The PSI was completed and
forwarded to the Court and counsel on November 21, 2013. The report of the defendant's mental
condition was received on or about January 31, 2014. The sentencing is sche~uled for March 2628, 2014.
On February 28. 2014, the defendant, by and through his attorney, Matthew J. Roker, filed a

Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty Pursuant to ICR 33(c). The stated reasons for the motion were
that the guilty plea was not made knowingly and intelligently and that Defeµdant was threatened by
other inmates that he would suffer physical harm if he did not accept a plea deal. In affidavits, the
defendant Michael Cu11ey asserts that an inmate whose name Culley recalls to be John Riggs
threatened him with physical harm if he testified against his codefendant, Jonathon Hernandez and
did not take the plea deal. The defendant also stated in his affidavit that following his guilty plea,
another inmate struck lim in the face breaking his glasses and causing a laceration above his eye.
Lastly, the defendant states that his current medication allows him to think more clearly and that he
now recalls more facts about the case that he believes will show that he is not guilty.

On March 11, 2014, the State filed an Objection to the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
The State argues that the defendant's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing, that he appeared
reasonably calm and clear-headed and that he repeatedly assured the Court that he understood the
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON MOTION TO
WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY PURSUANT TO ICR 33(C)
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proceedings.

LAW & ANALYSIS
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) governs the withdrawal of guilty pleas and states in full:

(c) Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty lllllY be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition
of sentance is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit
the defandant to withdraw defendant's plea.

I.C.R. 33(c).
As provided in State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-36, 211 P.3d 775, 780-81 (Ct.
App. 2008):
The granting or denial of such a motion is within the discretion of
the trial court. State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d
1308, 1310 (CtApp.1990). When the motion is made before the
pronouncement of sentence, such discretion should be liberally
exercised. Id Before sentencing, the inconvenience to the court
and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight
as compered to protecting the right of the accused to trial by jury.
State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 415, 816 P.2d 364, 371
(Ct.App.1991). Presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an
automatic right;. the defendant has the burden of showing a "just
reason" exists to withdraw the plea. State v. Hawkins, 117 Idaho
285, 289, 787 P.2d 271, 275 (1990); State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68,
72, 14 P.3d 388, 392 (CtApp.2000); State v. McFarland, 130
Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 (CtApp.1997).

In Hanslovan, the Court of Appeals outlined the steps for analyzing a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea as follows:

The first step in analyzing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to
determine whether the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959, 801 P.2d at 1310.
If the plea is constitutionally valid, the court must then determine
whether fl.ere are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the plea.
Id; see also State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 485, 861 P.2d 51, 55
(1993); Ward, 135 Idaho at 72, 14 P.3d at 392. This just reason
standard does not require that the defendant establish a
constitutional defect in the guilty plea. Id,· State v. Henderson, 113
Idaho 411, 413, 744 P.2d 795, 797 (Ct.App.1987). Once the
defendant has met this burden, the state may avoid withdrawal of
the plea by demonstrating the existence of prejudice. Dopp, 124
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Idaho at 485, 861 P.2d at 55; Ward, 135 Idaho at 72, 14 P.3d at

392.
Additionally, the scope of the trial court's discretion is affected by the timing of the
motion. State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct App. 2004). The Court of
Appeals in Mayer explained the following:
Where the motion is filed before sentencing, the defendant need
only show a 'Just reason" for withdrawing the plea. but after
sentenckig, the plea may be set aside only to correct manifest
injustice. I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801, 761
P.2d 11S1, 1153 (1988); State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 512, 516, 861
P.2d 81., 86 (Ct.App.1992). This distinction in the standards is
utilized to avoid encouraging defendants to plead guilty in order
to test the potential punishment and then withdraw the plea if the
sentence is unexpectedly severe. State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho
358, 361, 941 P.2d 330, 333 (CtApp.1997); State v. Freeman,
110 Idaho 117, 121, 714 P.2d 86, 90 (CtApp.1986). Even when
the motion is presented before sentencing, if it occurs after the
defendant has learned the content of the presentence report or has
received other information about the probable sentence, the court
may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent
motive. State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 411, 816 P.2d 364, 367
(CtApp.1991); State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139, 765 P.2d
162, 164 (Ct.App.1988). A defendant's failure to present and
support a plausible reason will dictate against granting
withdrawal, even absent prejudice to the prosecution. Dopp, 124
Idaho at 516, 861 P.2d at 86; Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959, 801
P.2d at 1310.

ANALYSIS
1. Was the defen•ant's guilty plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made?

To detennine whether a plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, the
Court must examine the record to determine:
(1) Whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2)
whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from
incrimimting himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood
the consequences of pleading guilty.

State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568,572,249 P.3d 367, 371 (2011) citing Dopp, 124 Idaho at 484,
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON MOTION TO
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861 P.2d at 54.
On October 9, 2013, the defendant entered his guilty plea

open court on the

At

that hearing, the Coort placed the defendant under oath and questioned him as to his
understanding of the :Rule 11 agreement.
[COURT]: Mr. Culley, first of all, why don't you just repeat for
me what you understand is going to happen today.
[CULLEY]: I'm pleading guilty to second degree murder.
[COURT]: And you understood that Counts II and III of the
Amended Indictment would be dismissed?
[CULLEY]: Yeah. Yes.
[COURT]: And what else do you understand?.
[CULLEY]: That's it
[COURT]: As far as you know, that's the full agreement?
[CULLEY]: Yeah.
The Court askoo if the defendant understood the plea agreement and asked if it was his
signature on the plea agreement The Court then asked if the defendant understood the guilty
plea advisory form and asked if it was his signature on the form. The defendant stated that he
understood the plea agreement and the explanations and questions on the guilty plea advisory

form, and that it was his signature thereon. He also stated that he went over both documents with
his attorney before court on October 9, 2013.

According to the record, the Court asked the following:
[COUR11: Now with these documents, what we're trying to do is
do our best to explain to you what rights you have, what rights you
might be waiving if you enter a plea of guilty, and also try to
explain to you the possible penalties that could be imposed. Do
you understand that?
[CULLEY]: Yes.
The Court went on to explain the maximum penalty for the offense of Murder in the
Second Degree was life in the state penitentiary, including a mandatory minimum period of ten

MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON MOTION TO
WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY PURSUANT TO ICR 33(C)

Page5

•
years. In addition, Mr. Roker stated that he went over

mandatory period of ten (10)

years with his client. The Court also stated that it was not required to follow either the sentence
recommendations of the State or defendant's counsel and that the Court could impose the
maximum period of incarceration of life in prison. The defendant stated that he understood the
possible penalty.
The Court referred to the explanations in the guilty plea advisory form regarding the
rights that the defendant would be waiving if he were to plead guilty and asked, "Did you put
your initials there to signify that you read and understood what was explained?" The defendant
responded, "Yes."
At the October 9, 2013 hearing, the defendant's responses were clear, coherent, and
deliberate.

The following exchange illustrates the defendant's articulate responses and his

understanding of the plea agreement and the Court's questions:
[COURT]: Did you have trouble reading or understanding these
questiom?
[CULLBY]: No.
[COURT]: Now, according to this, the highest grade you
completed is the eighth grade.
[CULLEY]: Yes.
[COURT]: So, I'm wondering, can you really read this?
[CULLEY]: After eighth grade, I got my GED, went to Job Corp
got my HSE and completed a trade, so yes.
[COURT]: So you didn't have any problem with this?
[CULLEY]: No.
The Court also asked Mr. Roker if he noticed if the defendant had any inability to
understand or read the English language. Mr. Roker said that he did not. Mr. Roker explained

that the defendant had a question regarding reserving his right to appeal any pre-trial issues but
that he explained to the defendant that those motions are filed prior to trial and none were filed in
this case.
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Then., the Court asked if it was correct that the defendant suffered from
and Attention Deficit Disorder and asked ifhe was currently on medication for those conditions.
The defendant stated that that was correct. The Court asked whether those disorders prevented

him from thinking clearly or understanding the proceedings that day. The defendant responded,
''No."
[COURT]: And, the medication you're taking. Does that affect your ability to
think or reason or understand what's going on today?
[CULLEY]: No.
[COURT]: So as you sit here today, you feel clear-headed and
have the ability to go forward voluntarily?
[CULLEY]: Yes.
The Court also asked whether the defendant had plenty of time to speak with his attorney
and whether he was satisfied with his legal advice. The defendant said, "Yes."
The Court read the Amended Indictment including each of the required elements for a
finding of Murder in Second Degree and asked, "To that charge, do you plead guilty?" The
defendant clearly stated, "Yes." The Court then asked that the defendant explain, in his own

words, what he did to be guilty of that offense.
The defendant provided the court with a factual basis for his plea. In his plea colloquy,
he stated that he and Jonathon Hernandez went to the home of Elizabeth Baune with the intention
to steal money or credit cards. Ms. Baune was home sleeping but that she woke up. The Court
asked, "So you were sneaking in her room trying to not wake her?" The defendant stated, ''No.

In the house. She was in her room and she woke up." The defendant said, "She came out. She
started yelling at Johnny, Johnny yelled back. He stabbed her and then kept stabbing her and
then handed me the knife and said, 'You with me or without me?' and then handed me the knife
and I stabbed her." Then., the Court repeated what the defendant said and asked if that was
correct
[COURT]: Did you witness Mr. Hernandez stabbing her?
[CULLEY]: Yes.
[COURT]: And you did nothing?

MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON MOTION TO
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[CULLEY]:
[COURT]: And then, Mr. Hernandez, as I understand you, said
'either you're with me or not with me' and handed you the knife?
[CULLEY]: Yes.
[COURT]: And what did you do?
[CULLEY]: I stabbed Elizabeth Baune.
[COURT]: In what part of her body?
[CULLEY]: Umm, back and chest.
[COURT]: And, it could have been any one of those stab wounds
that may have caused her death?
[CULLEY]: Yes.
[COURT]: Do you understand that?
[CULLEY]: Yes.
[COUR1]: Are you pleading guilty today because you believe
your stab wound could have been the fatal blow?
[CULLEY]: Yes.
The Court then asked Mr. Roker, after reviewing all of the evidence and reports, if he

was satisfied that the Court had a factual basis to accept the defendant's plea. Mr. Roker
responded, "Yes."

In addition to the record of defendant's guilty plea, the Court reviewed Dr. Clay H.
Ward's psychological evaluation of the defendant.

Dr. Ward conducted evaluations of the

defendant on December 31, 2013 and on January 18, 2014. With regard to the defendant's
mental capacity, Dr. Ward provides the following in his report on page one:
Michael Culley has a good understanding of the charges against
him. He has a good understanding of the consequences of his
guilty plea and there did not appear to be any significant issues
related to his competency to assist in his defense. He agreed to
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON MOTION TO
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participate in the evaluation without any stated reservations. He
also appeared competent to agree to participate in this evaluation.
Additionally, Dr. Ward's psychological evaluation provides the defendant's description
of his participation in the murder of Elizabeth. Baune. Notably, the description given to Dr.
Ward in his evaluations on December 31, 2013 and January 18, 2014 is the same description of
the crime that formed the factual basis for his plea of guilty on October 9, 2013. It is also
consistent with the confession he gave to police on November 9, 2012. See Transcript of Grand

Jury Proceedings November 19, 2012 (pg. 28-30).
The record indicates that this Court. the defendant, and his counsel, had lengthy
discussions regarding the plea agreement on October 9, 2013. The defendant testified under oath
when he entered his plea that: (1) he understood the charges and possible consequences of
pleading guilty; (2) he discussed the case with his attorney and was satisfied with his attorney's
performance; (3) he understood that he was giving up his right to trial; and ( 4) understood the
entirety of the plea agreement The record from October 9, 2013 reveals that the defendant's
responses are clear, coherent, and articulate. At times during the entry of his plea, he even
interjects to assure the Court that he has completed his GED and HSE and that he read and
understood the plea agreement Additionally, Dr. Ward's psychological evaluation provides the
Court with evidence tmt the defendant "has a good understanding of the charges against him"
and "a good understanclng of the consequences ofhls guilty plea."
Based on the evidence from the record of the defendant's entry of plea and the
psychological evaluati<mS conducted by Dr. Ward, this Court finds that the defendant's entry of
plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and that the defendant's entry of plea
complied with Idaho Criminal Rule 11. 1

1 LC.R. ll(c) Acceptance of Plea ofGuilty.-Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the record of the entire
proceedings, including reBS(Xlable inferences drawn therefrom, must show:
(1) The voluntariness of the plea.
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments,
and other direct consequences which may apply.
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the defendant would waive the right against compulsory selfincrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses against the defendant.
(4) The defendant was inforlled of the nature of the charge against the defendant.
(5) Whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining
agreement, and if so, the natsre of the agreement and that the defendant was informed that the court is not bound by
promises or recommemiwon from either party as to punishment

any
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2. Whether the Defendant provided just reasons for the withdrawal of his guilty plea.

The State correctly asserts that the defendant waived his right to withdraw his guilty plea
based on the terms of the Rule 11 plea agreement. Ordinarily, the Court's analysis would end
here as the defendant's plea was constitutionally valid and his rights were waived. However, this
Court will analyze the defendant's proposed reasons as ifhe did not waive his right to withdraw
his guilty plea.
After finding that the plea is constitutionally valid, the Court must then determine
whether there are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the plea. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959,
80 I P.2d at 1310. It is the defendant's burden to establish a just reason. Dopp, 124 Idaho at 485,
861 P.2d at 55; Ward, 135 Idaho at 72, 14 P.3d at 392. Because the defendant filed his Motion
to Withdraw Guilty Plea prior to sentencing but after he received the presentence report, "the
court may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive." State v. Johnson,
120 Idaho 408, 411, 816 P.2d 364, 367 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139, 765
P.2d 162, 164 (Ct.App.1988). A defendant's failure to present and support a plausible reason will
dictate against grantin1 withdrawal, even absent prejudice to the prosecution. Dopp, 124 Idaho at
516,861 P.2d at 86; Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959,801 P.2d at 1310. Presentence withdrawal of a
guilty plea is not an automatic right; the defendant has the burden of showing a ''just reasonn exists
to withdraw the plea. State v. Hawkins, 117 Idaho 285, 289, 787 P.2d 271, 275 (1990); State v.

Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d 388,392 (Ct.App.2000); State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362,
941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct.App.1997). It is in the Court's discretion to determine whether the defendant
satisfies the just reason standard. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959, 801 P.2d at 1310.
In the first and second Affidavits of Michael Culley in Support of Motion to Withdraw Plea

of Guilty, the defendant asserts two reasons for withdrawal of the plea: (1) another inmate
threatened him and said that if he did not take the plea deal, he would suffer physical harm while in
jail or prison if he testified against the codefendant, Jonathon Hernandez; and, (2) his current
medication allows him to think more clearly and he believes there are facts that would cause a jury
to find him not guilty. However, there is little, if any, evidence to support these claims.

When the defeooant's guilty plea was taken on October 9, 2013, the district court asked if
there had been any threats made to coerce him in any way into pleading guilty and the defendant
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said, "No." Then, on February 28, 2014, the defendant contended that be was threatened

other

inmates to plead guilty. On March 13, 2014 in his Second Affidavit, the defendant provides
name of John Riggs \\Ibo allegedly threatened him, but states that although he still believes the
threats to be credible, he is no longer compelled to plead guilty because of any threats.
Payette County Jail Commander, Clarence Costner, testified that he had received no
information that the defendant and Riggs had ever gotten into an argument or had an altercation. He
stated that Riggs and the codefendant, Hernandez, were housed together for a short time, but
according to Costner, Riggs left the Payette County Jail and went to prison in April 2013. This was
five months prior to Culley's guilty plea. It is hard to believe that any threat made by Riggs over
five months earlier continued to haunt the defendant Furthermore, co-defendant Hernandez had
changed his plea to guilty in August. 2013, approximately six weeks prior to Culley's plea of guilty.
So at the time of the guilty plea, there was never a necessity to testify against co-defendant
Hernandez.
Costner did testify that there have been several incidences involving the defendant in the
Payette County Jail. First, he stated that the defendant and his then-cellmate, Tyler Naughton, got
into a verbal altercation and had to be separated sometime before August 2013. But he stated that
there was nothing in the report that indicated that the altercation related to this particular case.
Costner further testified about a physical altercation between the defendant and an inmateworker named Luis Palomares on August 22, 2013. Costner stated that after watching video of the
incident, he observed what he believed to be a look of aggression given by Culley toward Palomares
and Palomares punched the defendant in the face, cutting his eye and breaking his glasses. Costner
testified that it was his opinion, based on the video, that the defendant instigated or "aggressed"
Palomares by walking toward him. He also stated that there was nothing in the report that indicated
that the altercation related to this particular case.
The evidence before the Court does not support a finding that the reported incidents were
related to this particular case. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the
defendant was coerced into pleading guilty by threats of physical harm.
As to the defendant's argument regarding a change in medication, Dr. Ward testified that
during the interviews he conducted of the defendant on December 31, 2013 and January 18, 2014

the defendant was coq,erative, showed "some delay in bis processing speed" but that his thinking
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was logical and coherem. In the psychological evaluation, Dr. Ward wrote that the defendant "has a

good understanding of the charges against him. He has a good understanding of the consequences
of his guilty plea and there did not appear to be any significant issues related to his competency to
assist in his defense."
Dr. Ward was asked to revisit the defendant on March 10, 2014 to evaluate him for any
changes in his mental state or memory of the events. Dr. Ward testified to the changes in the
defendant's demeanor :iom the last time he met with him on January 18, 2014. Dr. Ward said that
the defendant's speech was more pressured and rapid He also stated that during the March 10,
2014 evaluation, the defendant was able to provide more details and that his memory appeared

improved. However, he stated that the defendant's thought processes were "somewhat more loose
in the sense that there was some illogical portions to it." He stated that at times during his March 10

visit, the defendant had "delusional or magical sort of thinking" and that his thought processes
"were not linear, they were not analytical."

On cross-examination, the State asked Dr. Ward· if he believed the defendant was doing
worse now than when he met with him on December 31, 2013 and January 18, 2014. Dr. Ward
replied, "'In some ways.

He's thinking quicker and his memory's improved but his thought

processes are less coherent, less linear/' Based on that testimony, the Court cannot conclude that the
defendant's mental condition has improved. To the contrary, his mental condition apparently is less
coherent today than when Dr. Ward evaluated him on December 31, 2013 and January 18, 2014.
The evidence presented to the Court does not support a conclusion that the medication the
defendant was taking on October 9, 2013 had any effect on his ability to enter a knowing, intelligent
and voluntary entry of plea
Therefore,
ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and this does order that Defendant's Motion to Withdraw
Plea of Guilty is DENIED.

Dated this (1-lk day of

Marc.(

.2014.

~~D~tt
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